Dualism or . . . ?
I’ve wasted a half hour trying to rewrite a rather short notebook entry when I would probably be much better served by just posting it. The subject has been plaguing me for some time—mostly because of my intense dislike for it, and that despite (or is it in spite of?) the fact that several of my friends are staunch supporters of dualism. Given this, the entry below can only be understood as assuming the Eastern Orthodox ontological concept known as the Essence-Energies distinction. I may or may not expand on this later. With no further ado:
Why dualism? Why substance at all? Essence, in itself, has no existence—only by energizing, only as act does any thing exist. And who would believe that there are only two kinds of act? Clearly, there are many more. I therefore embrace existential pluralism—the plurality of becomings—undergirded by ontological monism. The being of becoming is univocal, while the mode of existence accounts for the phenomenal differences between body, mind, and whatever else. Substance (that needless bogeyman) dualism is thus an unnecessary—not to mention unsupported—speculation.
Ontological monism with respect to what? The fact that things have being?
In denying substance, are you saying there is not a “thing” which has physical powers and actions? It seems like things have to be enhypostatized in order to exist; they must be attached to, intrinsic to, had by a particular. What if that is all we mean by substance?